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ESSAY
ON EQUALITY: THE ANTI-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE
Donald J. Kochan *
Quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt.
INTRODUCTION
Equality 2-it is a concept that pervades political and social dis-
course throughout the country, and has done so for centuries.3
The Declaration of Independence provides, "WE hold these
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness . . . ."4 Consider the inscription on the facade of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. J.D., 1998, Cor-
nell Law School; B.A., 1995, Western Michigan University. I thank Ryan O'Dea for valua-
ble research assistance.
1. Translated as, "It holds good, according to natural law, that all men are equal."
BALLENTINE's LAw DICTIONARY 1045 (3d ed. 1969).
2. Equality means "[t]he quality or state of being equal; esp., likeness in power or
political status." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (9th ed. 2009). Equality before the law
means "[t]he status or condition of being treated fairly according to regularly established
norms of justice; esp., in British constitutional law." Id.; see also POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU,
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAws 1-2 (1980) (providing various definitions of equality
before the law).
3. See Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 245 (1983); see
also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835).
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For additional informa-
tion from the National Archives regarding the history of the Declaration of Independence,
see http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
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Supreme Court of the United States-"Equal Justice Under
Law"-as an indelible monument to equality in the foundation of
our legal system.' As Karst describes in his influential article,
"[tihe ideal of equality is one of the great themes in the culture of
American public life. From the Declaration of Independence to
the Pledge of Allegiance, the rhetoric of equality permeates our
symbols of nationhood."6 Karst may or may not concur with this
essay's ultimate conclusion, but his sentiment frames the de-
bate-defining equality and defining its ideal in light of govern-
ing principles.7
This essay seeks to summarize the general equality concept
and proposes that equality requires that the government engage
in anti-interference with individual choices and activities, so long
as these things create no negative externalities for others. If we
are serious about respecting equality, such interference actions
should be avoided. Adopting an "anti-interference principle" is a
necessary foundation for achieving the goal of true equality.
The primary point is that equality matters.' The purpose of this
essay is not to survey the vast political, jurisprudential, and aca-
demic debate on equality,9 but instead, to take a broad look at the
philosophical concept of equality itself. Part I discusses the gen-
eral meaning of equality. Part II presents brief summaries of
some selected recent developments regarding the concept of
5. For a description of the U.S. Supreme Court building and the inscription, see http:
//www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
6. Karst, supra note 3, at 245.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 273 ("Equality is a central theme in the native idiom of American culture.").
But see PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 165
(1970) ("[The rhetoric [of equality] is subject to use, if not capture, by anyone on any side
of the question."). Kurland's point is instructive that equality can be just a rhetorical de-
vice, but the discussion of the concept still has utility; and precisely because the word is so
often used, a discussion of appropriate uses is necessary.
9. For anthologies with many of the seminal works on equality, along with valuable
bibliographies, see EQUALITY (David Johnston ed., 2000); EQUALITY: SELECTED READINGS
(Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland eds., 1997). For other good samplings of the
scholarship, see EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (Ste-
phen Darwall ed., 1995) (a collection of works on equality by leading theorists including
G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, Amartya Sen, and Quentin
Skinner, with an introductory synopsis by Stephen Darwall) and THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY
(Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2002) (a collection of essays from leading
theorists). For another excellent compilation, see NOMOS IX: EQUALITY (J. Roland Pennock




equality, namely California's Proposition 810 and the U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in Ricci v. DeStefano.11 Part III introduces a
useful term for the equality discussion-"anti-interference"-and
argues that the best way to foster equality is to embrace freedom,
choice, and liberty in the absence of a showing that different
treatment is justified to avoid harm. Simply stated, equality is
best served when the government refrains from interfering with
individual choice and individual freedom.
I. THE DISCUSSION ON EQUALITY
The concept of equality has permeated debates on the struggle
between the individual and the state throughout the history of
the United States and other liberal systems of government. Our
yearning for equality is instinctual.' On equality, Locke wrote
that the state is bound by the principle that it must "govern by
promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cas-
es, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at
court and the countryman at plough." 3 Despite some historical
failings, equality has always been a part of the American dream
and the aspiration for freedom within the legal system.14 As such,
10. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California.").
11. 567 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
12. Karst, supra note 3, at 251 ("[The idea of equality seems to be a vital component
of children's early understanding of justice.... By the time children are teen-agers, they
understand that inequalities are often justified.").
13. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. XI, § 142 (J.W.
Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1690).
14. See Karst, supra note 3, at 245. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the legal impor-
tance of equality in the American system, and the "equality of condition" that was so pre-
valent in its society. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 3, at 3; see also J. HECTOR ST. JOHN
CREVECOER, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 79 (Fox, Duffield & Co. 1904) (1782)
(Immigrants in America can go "[flrom nothing to start into being; from a servant to the
rank of a master; from being the slave of some despotic prince, to become a free man, in-
vested with lands ... ! What a change indeed! It is in consequence of that change that he
becomes an American."). The term "equality of opportunity" is itself susceptible to differ-
ent meanings in the literature. Andrew Mason, Equality of Opportunity, Old and New, 111
ETHICS 760, 764, 780 (2001) (discussing equal opportunity theories based on responsibili-
ty-sensitive egalitarianism and meritocratic view of equality of opportunity and explaining
how they can coexist, but also noting that their justifications do not rule out imposition of
external controls). On the equal opportunity debate, see generally JOHN E. ROEMER,
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (1998); Charles Frankel, Equality of Opportunity, 81 ETHICS
191 (1971); and John H. Schaar, Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond, in NOMOS IX:
EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 228-49.
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equality has long been embedded in our constitutional law and
jurisprudence."
In a recent article, Judge Jack Weinstein of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York surveyed our nation's
historic struggle with defining and mechanizing the protection of
equality.16 Weinstein effectively describes the struggle as centered
on the definitional issue:
If we are to understand the modern struggle with the concept of
equality, we must consider a series of attempts at equalizations in
such matters as politics, religion, socio-economics, education, and
compensatory justice. As Aristotle recognized, we have to inquire:
Equal in what respect? He would put it this way: No distinction
ought to be made between people who are equal in all respects rele-
vant to the kind of treatment in question, even though in other (irre-
levant) respects they may be unequal. We must ask: Which respects
should we now consider relevant in measuring equality in this coun-
try?'7
Weinstein explained that "[e]quality has a chameleon-like quali-
ty," and is envisioned in many forms.'
Equality is indeed a pervasive concept, and disagreements on
its definition loom large.'9 This essay must accept that reality and
recognize that the equality literature is rich, diverse, and exten-
sive. 20 Certain modern theorists and their works-particularly
Cohen, Dworkin, Nozick, Rawls, and Sen-have a dominant pres-
ence in the discourse.2' These and many other notable theoretical
15. See Karst, supra note 3, at 278 ("Lawyers and judges who want to promote the
values of equal citizenship cannot afford to abandon the constitutional rhetoric of equali-
ty.").
16. See Jack B. Weinstein, Changing Equalities, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 421 (2010).
17. Id. at 423 (footnote omitted).
18. Id.
19. Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Re-
ply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 607 (1983) (surveying literature on different meanings of equal-
ity but contending that "[t]he concept of equality is one and the same in all its usages").
20. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2008); G.A. COHEN,
SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY (1995); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
The work of these scholars is vast and the discussion of issues of equality can be found in
most of their broader philosophical works, whether in book or article form. Some articles
focused exclusively on the equality issue are particularly notable. See, e.g., Ronald Dwor-
kin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ro-
nald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283
[Vol. 45:431434
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leaders help shape the contemporary equality debate. 22 The mean-
ing of equality is a hotly contested issue within and between
these works.
The debates within this body of literature certainly inform the
conclusions reached in this essay, and those writings deserve fur-
ther attention for anyone seeking to understand the competing
theories on equality prevalent today. But this essay does not en-
deavor to place its analysis within this impressive and admittedly
intimidating array of scholarship. Instead, it endeavors to sup-
plement the existing discussion with a prism for analyzing equal-
ity that I call the "anti-interference principle." The remaining
portion of this Part will provide the initial premises supporting
this essay's ultimate embrace of that guiding principle of anti-
interference as a tool for evaluation of legitimate governmental
action.
From the Declaration of Independence to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the fundamental principle
of equality is embodied in our controlling laws.2 The Fourteenth
Amendment provides in part:
(1981); Amartya K. Sen, From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality, 64 S. ECON. J.
384 (1997); Amartya K. Sen, On the Status of Equality, 24 POL. THEORY 394 (1996). For
certain comparisons among theorists, see, for example, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: ANALYZ-
ING RAWLS AND NOZICK (J. Angelo Corlett ed., 1991); Stephen O'Hanlon, Equality, En-
titlement, and Efficiency: Dworkin, Nozick, Posner, and Implications for Legal Theory, 8
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 31 (2009).
22. See, e.g., JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE
ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT (1999); SANFORD A. LAKOFF, EQUALITY IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (1964); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991); J.R. POLE, THE
PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1978); LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993);
Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287 (1999); Hugo Adam
Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality, in NOMos IX: EQUALITY, supra note 9, at
3, 19; Isaiah Berlin, Equality as an Ideal, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 128, 130-31, 150
(F. Olafson ed., 1961); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor
Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); John E. Coons & Patrick M. Brennan, Nature and
Human Equality, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 287 (1995); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citi-
zens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 (2007); Irving Kristol,
Equality as an Ideal, in 5 INT'L ENCYC. SOC. SCI. 108, 110 (William A. Darity ed., 2d ed.
2008); John Plamenatz, Diversity of Rights and Kinds of Equality, in NOMOS IX:
EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 79, 82; Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 537 (1982).
23. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. See generally MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1962); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the pri-
vileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.2 4
Of the provisions in this amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
usually receives the most attention.25
Historically, the Privileges or Immunities Clause26 has received
less attention in contemporary debates on the principle of equali-
ty embedded in the constitutional structure; however, in recent
years, there has been a fair amount of renewed interest.2 1 Several
competing theories of its meaning have been debated. 28 This essay
does not intend to resolve that debate, except to agree with the
position that at the very least, the Clause should be interpreted
to mean that where one group or class is granted a privilege or
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For valuable discussions on the history of the Equal
Protection Clause, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); RAOUL BERGER, SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE CONSTITUTION
165-69 (1987); EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2003).
25. Many articles on the Fourteenth Amendment focus on larger theories of equality
based on the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pa-
riah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citi-
zenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); R.A. Lenhardt, Un-
derstanding The Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803
(2004); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. On the history of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, see BERGER, supra note 24, at 169-72.
27. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I:
"Privileges and Immunities" as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1244 (2010);
Clark M. Neily III & Robert J. McNamara, Getting Beyond Guns: Context for the Coming
Debate Over Privileges or Immunities, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 15, 18 (2009) (arguing for a
liberty-enhancing and government-limiting interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
particularly based in protections against government intrusion under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause).
28. See generally Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone's Commentaries and the Privileges or
Immunities of United States Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 777 (2008). Claeys surveys the debates over the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
discussing the interpretive views in the following works, among others: ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990); DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-
1888, at 239 n.12, 342-51 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Further Thoughts on the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1096, 1098-
99 (2005); Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 334, 340-51
(2005); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1410-33, 1451-56 (1992).
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immunity, another group should not be denied the same. 29 The
two clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment-privileges or immun-
ities and equal protection-must be read together as supporting a
general constitutional recognition of an equality concept.
Once a state begins to move beyond the basic privileges or im-
munities inherent in liberty and grant new privileges or immuni-
ties to only certain classes, equality blurs and society becomes
mired in factional conflicts.3 0 On several issues, we see that today.
That is not to say that states should create privileges or immuni-
ties at all, but once they do-once they walk down that road-the
government must open up the privileges or immunities to all per-
sons or groups on a nondiscriminatory basis.3 ' The government
has created far too many "privileges," but once they are created,
they should be available for all people. Equality demands it.
Grant nothing beyond basic liberty if you will, but once we grant
some privilege or immunity then it should be made equally avail-
able without special beneficiaries. Favoring some over others
would violate the anti-interference principle. There must be an
equal playing ground. Furthermore, if the principle applies, the
government similarly cannot create an interference and then find
"less-interfering" exemptions therefore justified. In fact, so long
as the interference exists, even if unjustified, it should interfere
with all equally (in other words, no exemptions from the interfe-
rence).
Equality, in a legal sense, means that no person or class rece-
ives privileges or immunities, or punishments, in any discrimina-
tory sense.32 The law cannot avoid the seduction of satisfying par-
ticular political interests, ultimately leading to unequal treat-
ment. But the law should strive to avoid such seduction if the ba-
sic core of equality is to be preserved. That is a basic principle of
democracy long-held where all are treated alike to the utmost.33
29. See Harrison, supra note 28, at 1410-33, 1451-56.
30. See Karst, supra note 3, at 255-56 ("More generally, the American colonists re-
sisted the idea of legal privileges attached to personal status.").
31. Harrison, supra note 28, at 1412-13.
32. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 616.
33. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. IV, § 1291b30, at 250 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin
ed. 1992) ("In such a democracy the law interprets equality as meaning that the poor shall
not enjoy any more advantage than the rich, that neither shall be sovereign, but both shall
be exactly similar. For if, as is held by some, freedom is especially to be found in democra-
cy, and also equality, this condition is most fully realized when all alike share most fully
2011]1 437
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This essay dubs the guidance that can best serve the concept of
equality as the "anti-interference principle": The government
should not target persons for negative treatment. Persons should
not face interference with their equal opportunities in their pur-
suits; and no one should be entitled to equal outcomes or a redi-
stributed share (meaning then that all entitlements that take
from others to subsidize a special class-whether it be corporate
or social-would be prohibited). Additionally, there is a right to
the equality of condition under law-but condition unshackled
and condition achieved, not condition given or condition in re-
sults. An individual's condition needs to be of his own making,
and the means for the making must be protected equally. The
anti-interference principle is a matter of recognizing the sove-
reignty of the individual, and the limitation of governmental in-
trusion upon it so that individuals can reach equality. The condi-
tion of freedom requires the condition of equality, and vice versa.
II. SELECTED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON EQUALITY IN THE
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL DEBATE
Certainly there is extensive discussion on equality in legal lite-
rature and case law. As stated at the outset, it is not a purpose of
this essay to survey these materials-many qualified people have
already accomplished that task. It is also not a purpose of this es-
say to explain or analyze the complex literature and case law spe-
cifically on the meaning and application of the Equal Protection
Clause. That too is a wide, complex, and confusing scholarly and
judicial debate. 34
Whatever the nature of the distinctions-race, ethnicity, gend-
er, sexual orientation, income, or others-equality under the law
should live up to its name. However, from Reconstruction3 1 to the
women's suffrage movement,36 to the civil rights movement," to
in the constitution.); THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 236 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1968) (de-
scribing how democracy, if ideally structured, would seem to be "a sweet regime ... dis-
pensing a certain equality to equals and unequals alike").
34. See Nirej S. Sekhon, Equality and Identity Hierarchy, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
349, 350 (2008) ("There is little if any recent scholarship advancing a theory of equality
that actually describes the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence.").
35. See generally, e.g., THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSID-
ERATIONS (Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds., 1999); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUC-
TION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (First Perennial Classics ed., 1989).
36. See generally, e.g., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al.
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ongoing (and seemingly endless) debates over other issues such as
same-sex marriage laws,38 we have yet to fully define equality be-
fore the law. Nor is there likely to ever be a consensus on its best
meaning or the appropriate role of the state in its achievement.
From the dismantling of legal segregation leading to Brown v.
Board of Education,3 9 or interracial marriage issues in Loving v.
Virginia,<o some insight can be gleaned to help contextualize the
current and continuing debate on how the law understands the
concept of equality. Has the law fully reached a "post-
discriminatory" ethic? Certainly not. It is definitely questionable
whether American society is even achieving the "post-racial"
promise some claimed would accompany the investiture of the
Obama administration' let alone whether society or its laws can
ever achieve a true and comprehensive nondiscriminatory foun-
dation. Preferences and privileges abound, all subject to critique
from equality theories including, as here, from the principle of
anti-interference.
eds., 1969); COLLEEN ADAMS, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE: A PRIMARY SOURCE HISTORY OF THE
WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003).
37. See generally, e.g., TEACHING THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FREEDOM'S
BITTERSWEET SONG (Julie Buckner Armstrong et al. eds., 2002); REGGIE FINLAYSON, WE
SHALL OVERCOME: THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2003).
38. See infra notes 42, 44 and accompanying text.
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For recent commentary on the importance of Brown, see Paul
Finkelman, The Centrality of Brown, in CHOOSING EQUALITY: ESSAYS AND NARRATIVES ON
THE DESEGREGATION EXPERIENCE 224, 225-26 (Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Leland Ware
eds., 2009) (acknowledging Brown's importance and influence but questioning its impact),
and Karst, supra note 3, at 285 (discussing scholarship on Brown).
40. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. Early in the 2008 presidential campaign, pundits began to tout an Obama presi-
dency as shepherding in a post-racial era. See, e.g., Michael Crowley, Post-Racial, Even
White Supremacists Don't Hate Obama, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 12, 2008, at 7; Shelby Steele,
Obama's Post-Racial Promise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A31. The characterization took
hold in popular discourse. See Neubia Williams, Note, A Post-Racial Era?: How the Elec-
tion of President Obama and Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence Illustrate That the
United States Is Not Beyond the Centrality of Race, 4 S. REGIONAL BLACK L. STUDENTS
ASS'N L.J. 1, 1 (2010) ("In the wake of the election, the term 'post-racial era' has become
more commonplace in the vocabulary of pundits and ordinary citizens alike."); see also
Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1593 (2009) (discussing the emergence of
advocacy for a "post-racial ideology," although criticizing it as unwarranted and danger-
ous). Many claim, however, that the projected post-racial era has certainly not surfaced.
See, e.g., Editorial, Obama Team Pushes Quotas: The Justice Department Is Playing Divi-
sive Racial Games, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at B2 ("Far from being a 'post-racial' pres-
idency, the Obama administration continues to pick the scab of racial discord."); Editorial,
No Getting Past Race in America, INV. Bus. DAILY, Sept. 2, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
17101293 (criticizing the Obama administration's fixation on race and teasing, "[a]nd you
thought you were getting a post-racial presidency").
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Several recent court cases have engaged the philosophical and
legal debate on equality. Two notable examples are the cases ex-
amining Proposition 8 regarding same-sex marriage42 and the lat-
est affirmative action decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in
Ricci v. DeStefano.4
Perhaps the most noticeable legal equality debate in the public
eye in recent years centers around same-sex marriage and Cali-
fornia's Proposition 8.44 The same-sex marriage debate has a long
history in California-including a veritable ping-pong match be-
tween initiative voters and the courts, starting before the year
2000 and continuing to present day. 45
Proposition 8, a voter-enacted amendment to the California
Constitution, successfully passed in November 2008 in response
to court decisions that invalidated, on state constitutional law
42. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to be Named: Moving Beyond Race
To Explain Why "Separate" Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never
Be "Equal", 97 GEO L.J. 1155, 1159-60 (2009) (discussing inequality nomenclature and
analyzing the way courts and scholars treat substantive equality versus nominal equality).
For commentary on the history and debate on Proposition 8, see generally M. Katherine
Baird Darmer, 'Activist" Courts, Misleading Wedge Politics and the Tragedy of Proposition
8, 14 NEXUS 69, 70 (2008); Jeffrey A. Redding, Proposition 8 and the Future of American
Same-Sex Marriage Activism, 14 NEXUS 113 (2008); Ronald Steiner, Understanding the
Prop 8 Litigation: The Scope of Direct Democracy and Role of Judicial Scrutiny, 14
NEXUS, 81, 81-82 (2008).
43. 567 U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
44. See Nicholas Goldberg, Gay Marriage on Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009 (describ-
ing the "twists and turns" from Proposition 22 to Proposition 8) ("The battle over same-sex
marriage sometimes seems endless."); John Wildermuth, Prop. 8 Among Costliest Meas-
ures in History, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2009, at Bl (describing Proposition 8 campaign fin-
ances). Recently, in Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009), the Iowa Supreme
Court also invalidated a gay marriage ban based on a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause under an intermediate scrutiny analysis.
45. Several law review articles written in opposition to Proposition 8 provide good
summaries of the issues involved and the history of the relevant case law. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, Foreword: Judicial Opinions as Public Rhetoric, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1763,
1763-64 (2009) (using the In re Marriage Cases opinion as a case study in whether "judi-
cial opinions [should] seek to persuade the public"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Two Cheers for
State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1696-98 (2010) (concerning the decision
and justification for challenging Proposition 8 in federal court); M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany
Chang, Moving Beyond the "Immutability Debate" in the Fight for Equality After Proposi-
tion 8, 12 SCHOLAR 1 (2009) (discussing the history of Proposition 8, the legal issues in-
volved, and the treatment of LGBT rights in the courts); see also supra note 42 and accom-
panying text. Some articles, of course, explain that history as well but take the opposite
view on whether equality demands recognition of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Robert
John Araujo, Same-Sex Marriage from Privacy to Equality: The Failure of the "Equality"
Justifications for Same-Sex Marriage, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 195 (2010).
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grounds, California's legislative ban on same-sex marriage.4 6
Proposition 8 essentially allowed the electorate to invalidate, in
part, the California Supreme Court decision in In re Marriage
Cases.47 Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution to
read: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or rec-
ognized in California."41 Once the amendment passed, some ar-
gued that the constitutional "ban" on same-sex marriage, or more
precisely its limitation on recognition of any marriage other than
between a man and a woman, by definition made the restriction
constitutional, at least on state law grounds.49
On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld Cali-
fornia's constitutional amendment banning gay marriage in
Strauss v. Horton.50 On May 22, 2009, a separate group of plain-
tiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8
while the state court challenge was still pending.1 In Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California invalidated Proposition 8 as unconstitutional on Au-
gust 4, 2010.52 Chief Judge Vaughn Walker's eighty-page opinion
46. Ben Ehrenreich, Anatomy of a Failed Campaign, ADVOCATE, Dec. 2008, at 34,
available at http://www.advocate.com/Politics/Election/Anatomy_oLa_FailedCampaign/
(discussing the events and spending during the Proposition 8 campaign, the postelection
response, and that despite disparities, the "Yes side still won-52.3% to 47.7%"); Editorial,
State Should Stay Out of Marriage: Revoking Same-Sex Couples' Right to Marry Doesn't
Belong in the State Constitution, APPEAL-DEMOCRAT (Marysville, Cal.), Oct. 4, 2008,
http://www.appeal-democrat.comlarticleslmarriage-69456-california-state.html (discussing
"simple fairness" and Proposition 8).
47. Cal. Proposition 8 (2008) (superseding In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426
(Cal. 2008)).
48. Id.; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
49. See generally Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at 35.
50. 207 P.3d 48, 63-64 (Cal. 2009); see also Strauss v. Horton: Proposition 8 Valid But
Not Applicable Retroactively, RECORDER, May 27, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
21597292 ("The California Supreme Court ... held that the recently enacted Proposition
8, which rendered unlawful the marriage of same-sex couples, constituted a permissible
constitutional amendment and did not violate the separation of powers doctrine, but none-
theless did not apply retroactively and thus did not invalidate the marriages of same-sex
couples performed prior to the effective date of Prop 8.').
51. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also
Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop. 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAW., Jan. 2010, http:11
www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid=906575&evid=1.
52. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. For news discussions and summaries of the deci-
sion and the opinion in the case, see Maura Dolan & Carol J. Williams, Ban on Gay Mar-
riage Overturned; Appeal Promised After Federal Judge Finds State's Prop. 8 Unconstitu-
tional, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at Al; Jesse McKinley & John Schwarts, California Ban
on Gay Marriage Is Struck Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at Al; see also Maura Dolan &
Carol J. Williams, Facts Anchor Marriage Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at Al; Tim
Rutten, Marriage Reconsidered, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A27.
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found California's decision to privilege some over others without
adequate basis in law or fact, concluding that:
Proposition 8 fails to advance any rational basis in singling out gay
men and lesbians for denial of a marriage license. Indeed, the evi-
dence shows Proposition 8 does nothing more than enshrine in the
California Constitution the notion that opposite-sex couples are su-
perior to same-sex couples. Because California has no interest in dis-
criminating against gay men and lesbians, and because Proposition 8
prevents California from fulfilling its constitutional obligation to
provide marriages on an equal basis, the court concludes that Propo-
sition 8 is unconstitutional."
Walker's ruling was based, in essence, on the finding that the
state was unable to establish any state interest justifying the dif-
ferential treatment and was unable to establish the existence of
any harm as a result of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. 54 No rational basis existed to legitimize the differential
treatment of singling out only unions between a man and a wom-
an for receiving recognition of a valid marriage and the exclusive
imprimatur of the state."
After the ruling and legal wrangling over whether the decision
would be stayed pending appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ultimately granted a stay before the district court
decision became operable, 6 and the court of appeals will have the
next opportunity to weigh in on this lingering controversy.57 As of
this writing, that appeal was still pending.5
Several of the commentary headlines screamed that the court's
decision in Perry was a major victory for equality.59 It is indeed a
53. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
54. Id. at 998, 1003.
55. Id. at 997-98.
56. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
2010).
57. Id. ("This appeal shall be calendared during the week of December 6, 2010 .... ")
see also Zusha Elinson, After Marriage Ruling, Uncertainty Still Lingers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2010, at A17; Jesse McKinley, Green Light and Delay On Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A12. There remains some question whether Proposition 8 suppor-
ters have standing to bring the appeal, which is a separate note of interest for many inde-
pendent of the substantive arguments on Proposition 8's constitutionality. See, e.g., Maura
Dolan & Lee Romney, Prop. 8 Hangs By a Legal Thread; Judge Will Lift Stay on Gay Mar-
riages Next Week as Grounds for Appeal Narrow, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at Al; Edi-
torial, Prop. 8 on the Clock: The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Has Shown a Proper Sense of
Urgency in Ruling on the Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A16.
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Ruling Steeped in Principle of Equality, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5,
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groundbreaking precedento6 and The Los Angeles Times pro-
claimed it a victory for the reason that it "changes the debate ...
forever."1 Indeed the majority of opinion in the press viewed the
decision favorably,62 although some found it wrongly decided or
otherwise objectionable, and the opposition to same-sex marriage
remains to fight on.63
In light of this development, it might seem appropriate to focus
on the same-sex marriage cases in any article about the law of
equality as it should be examined today. However, this essay will
not do so; it will not examine the reasoning in Perry except to ac-
knowledge that the result can be justified with the application of
the principle of anti-interference, especially because the Perry de-
cision focused on the absence of harm as a determining factor in
holding that the unequal treatment could not be justified.6 4
Any further focus on such a highly contested issue would be di-
versionary from the central discussion of this essay; moreover,
the already extensive literature will very quickly become satu-
rated on that topic with a cornucopia of analysis and opinions. 61 It
2010, at A10; Scott Herhold, A Victory for the Cause of Equality, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Aug. 5, 2010, at 1A; Editorial, Equal Protection Prevails in Court, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Aug. 5, 2010, at 12A; Editorial, Equality Prevails, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 2010, at A15.
60. See Peter Schrag, Viewpoints: Prop. 8 Decision One for the Law Books,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 6, 2010, at I1A.
61. Editorial, Proposition 8 Ruling Changes the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage For-
ever L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-prop8-
20100805,0,3655162.story.
62. See, e.g., M. Katherine B. Darmer, GOP Candidates and Prop 8, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.ocregister.comlopinion/walker-261308-couples-whitman.
html; Letter to the Editor, A Legal Victory for Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at
A22; Editorial, A Victory for Gay Marriage: A Judge's Ruling Striking Down California's
Proposition 8 Is Justified, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2010, at A18; Editorial, Equality for Gay
Couples, DENVER POST, Aug. 8, 2010, at D3; Editorial, Gay Marriages Again, Soon, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A20; Editorial, In Defense of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010,
at Al8; Editorial, Marriage Is a Constitutional Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A26;
Editorial, Marriage Not State's Business, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 4, 2010, http://www.
ocregister.com/opinion/sex-260739-marriage-decision.html.
63. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Editorial, Same-Sex Marriage Decision: Federal Judge
Went Too Far on California Ban, OREGONIAN, Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/op
inionlindex.ssfl2010/08/same-sex marriage-federaljudg.html; Kevin Tait, Editorial,
Judge's Decision on Prop. 8 Tears at Throat of Democracy, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2010, at
8; Tim Wildmon, A Biased Ruling on Gay Marriage in California, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2010, at A21; Editorial, The Arrogance of Judicial Power: Homosexuals Hijack Political
Process for Their Own Ends, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at B2; see also Mike Anton, Prop.
8 Backers Angry at Reversal of Voter Mandate, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A21.
64. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
65. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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is enough to recognize that the marriage debate demonstrates the
continuing struggle over the meaning of equality today and the
fact that equality will endlessly find new testing grounds even in
our rather mature legal system.
Also enlightening to this essay's central theme is the June 2009
decision from the Supreme Court in Ricci v. DeStefano,66 which
further aptly represents the continued debate on equality under
law.6 1 Many consider Ricci a groundbreaking decision on equali-
ty.6" Some have called it a milestone for cultural change,'69 others
claim it is a decision that raises the bar on reverse discrimina-
tion, 0 and still others argue it signals that the courts are taking
discrimination more seriously.7' Despite some limited commen-
tary and analysis downplaying Ricci as a very narrow decision, 72
it nonetheless has strong legs in the affirmative action, anti-
discrimination, and equality debates.
In Ricci, interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1
the Court held that city officials were prohibited from denying
promotions to white and hispanic firefighters simply because
black firefighters did not perform as well on certain tests without
66. 557 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). For a recent note discussing the decision, see
Kristina Campbell, Note, Will "Equal"Again Mean Equal?: Understanding Ricci v. DeSte-
fano, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 385, 387-88 (2010) (describing the Ricci decision and opining
that it "will be remembered as the case with the greatest impact on race jurisprudence in
recent history").
67. See, e.g., Laura Fitzpatrick, A Brief History of: Affirmative Action, TIME, July 13,
2009, at 20 (discussing Ricci) ("The court has long walked a fine line on the issue [of affir-
mative action] . .. .").
68. See Joseph Williams, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Connecticut Firefighters:
Group Accused City of Racial Discrimination, Bos. GLOBE, June 30, 2009 at A10 ("[L]egal
analysts said the court's decision dramatically shifts the affirmative action landscape.").
69. See, e.g., Ward Connerly, Ricci and the Future of Race in America, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, July 14, 2009, at 9 ("Clearly, the Ricci decision represents somewhat of a legal
milestone" with "cultural significance.").
70. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, The Meaning of Ricci, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 2009, at
C15 ("The import of Ricci, which raised the bar on reverse discrimination, is that it heads
us once again toward that day-and back to true colorblindness that was the original vi-
sion, and everlasting glory, of the civil rights movement.").
71. See, e.g., Michael E. Rosman, Make Race Irrelevant, USA TODAY, June 30, 2009, at
8A ("[T]he Supreme Court in Ricci . . . shows that the nation's highest court is getting se-
rious about ridding our society of race discrimination. . . .").
72. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Court Backs White Firefighters: Justices Decide City
Erred in Tossing Test To Aid Minorities, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 2009, at C12 ("[I]t does not
appear to make a sweeping change in the law.").
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006). Notably the Ricci decision did not reach the
question whether there was a constitutional violation under the Equal Protection Clause.
557 U.S. _, _, 129 S. Ct. 2859, 2664-65 (2009).
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"a strong basis in evidence that, had [the city] not taken the
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact sta-
tute."14
For purposes of this essay, the most interesting discussion in
Ricci lies in Justice Scalia's concurrence. Justice Scalia summa-
rized the controlling principle against discrimination and favored
seeing the concept of equality as one of neutrality.76 He viewed
the disadvantaging action against the white and hispanic fire-
fighters as a discriminatory action that the government could not
do itself nor compel an employer to take at the government's di-
rection.7 6 Justice Scalia wrote: "[I]f the Federal Government is
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, then surely it
is also prohibited from enacting laws mandating that third par-
ties-e.g., employers, whether private, State, or municipal-
discriminate on the basis of race."77 In the end, the majority of the
Court said that the civil rights laws cannot compel private indi-
viduals to create equal results or equal outcomes, especially if the
decision discriminates against nonminorities without justifica-
tion.78
Often, merit matters, and it should as it is the best metric for
judging the neutrality of rules and implementing anti-
discrimination policies. 9 The Ricci decision supports the long-
recognized focus on individualism and meritocracy" that under-
74. 557 U.S. at , 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
75. Id. at, 129 S. Ct. at 2682-83. (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Id. at , 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)).
77. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2676 (discussing "a
neutral selection system that safeguards against the very racial animosities Title VII was
intended to prevent").
78. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2676, 2681. For media coverage on the Ricci case, see, for
example, Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Finds Bias Against White Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2009, at Al (describing the Ricci decision and quoting Professor Sheila Foster as
saying "[tihis decision will change the landscape of civil rights law"); David G. Savage, Di-
versity Decision May Alter Hiring, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at Al (explaining the Ricci
decision); Abigail Thernstrom, The Supreme Court Says No To Quotas, WALL ST. J., July 1,
2009, at Al3 (generally discussing the Ricci opinion); Editorial, Firefighters and Race,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A32 (strongly supporting the Ricci dissent).
79. See Rosman, supra note 71 ("The purpose of our anti-discrimination laws is to
make race as irrelevant as possible. Their underlying assumption is that all races could
succeed if decisions were made based on merit and not someone's heritage.").
80. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 3, at 261 n.82 ("[L]est we wax too lyrical over the joys
of equal opportunity, let us remember that the losers in a perfect meritocracy have the
knowledge that they lost fairly-so that they have nothing to blame but their own fail-
ings.").
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scores the anti-interference principle described below as a prism
for defining equality.
III. THE ANTI-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE:
A NEW, YET OLD, PRISM FOR EVALUATING LEGAL
PRINCIPLES ON EQUALITY
The "anti-interference principle" is a necessary foundation for
achieving the goal of true equality. Equality requires that the
government engage in anti-interference with individual choices
and activities. Unequal treatment is justifiable only when
grounded in avoidance of some harm that can be minimized only
through differential treatment. Absent avoidance of harm, special
designations, privileges, or classifications necessarily interfere
with equality in ways that violate the anti-interference principle.
Equality talk is already flooded with nuances, phrases, and
terms."' Several main terms usually surface in the nomenclature
when analyzing the legitimacy of legal rules, many with shared
themes 2 and some in direct thematic competition."3 The primary
terms used in scholarship and jurisprudence for the legal prin-
ciples regarding equality include antidifferention 8 anticlassifica-
81. Id. at 279 ("The importance of the rhetoric of equality in constitutional adjudica-
tion is hard to overstate.").
82. Kenneth L. Marcus, Jurisprudence of the New Anti-Semitism, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 371, 408 (2009) ("Two primary theoretical frameworks have emerged to explain the
wrongfulness of the various forms of conduct which constitute illicit discrimination. Broad-
ly speaking, they can be described as antidifferentiation (or anticlassification) theory and
antisubordination (or anticaste) theory. Interestingly, these two bodies have evolved over
time in a manner which demonstrates a core, common concern." (footnotes omitted)).
83. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471-75 (2004). ("For
many, the belief that anticlassification commitments are fundamental entails the view
that our tradition embraces a particular conception of equality, one that is committed to
individuals rather than to groups. On this account, the tradition's embrace of the anticlas-
sification principle signifies its repudiation of an alternative conception of equal protec-
tion, the antisubordination principle: the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage
in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups. . . . The
understanding that anticlassification and antisubordination are competing principles that
vindicate different complexes of values and justify different doctrinal regimes is an out-
growth of decades of struggle over Brown, and is not itself a ground of the decision or of
the earliest debates it prompted." (footnotes omitted)).
84. See Marcus, supra note 82, at 409 ("Under antidifferentiation theory, wrongful
discrimination consists of unequal treatment based on suspect characteristics, such as
race, religion, or national origin. Discrimination so construed may be understood as a fail-
ure of impartiality.... This approach has increasingly been associated with conservative
commentators in recent years and is apparent in recent Supreme Court decisions address-
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tion," antisubordination or anticaste," antistigmatic," equal citi-
zenship,"8 and otherwise generally antipartiality or antidiscrimi-
nation. 9 Each has its own merits as well as its own shortfalls.
Each term or characterization is sometimes politically or philo-
sophically loaded in the jurisprudence and academic discourse.
Though introduction of another term admittedly may be subject
to a similar critique, the anti-interference principle best captures
the concept of equality as it should relate to the government and
its treatment of individuals. If nothing else, anti-interference is a
missing term in the mix of the equality discussion.
ing affirmative action.. . . Arguably, it is now the 'standard view' that American antidi-
scrimination law is based upon antidifferentiation theory, although some commentators
argue that this theory does not fully explain contemporary civil rights jurisprudence."
(footnotes omitted)).
85. See Siegel, supra note 83, at 1472-73.
86. See Marcus, supra note 82, at 411 ("Under antisubordination theory, wrongful dis-
crimination consists of 'any conduct that has the effect of subordinating or continuing the
subordination of a minority group' or which demeans individuals by denying them the con-
cern and respect which flows from their equal moral worth. In Owen Fiss's influential
formulation, 'what is critical . . . is that the state law or practice aggravates (or perpe-
tuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group. . .. In recent years,
antisubordination theory has been more influential among academic commentators than
among members of the Supreme Court, although its academic influence is formidable."
(footnotes omitted)).
87. Id. at 409-10 ("In recent years, the Court has offered two rationales for the anti-
differentiation theory: individual stigma and social conflict..... The genesis of this notion
is in the Court's finding in Brown v. Board of Education. . . ." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Karst, supra note 3, at 248-49 ("[]t is precisely the denial of equal status, the treatment
of someone as an inferior, that causes stigmatic harm. . . . When we are guarding against
the stigma of inferiority, it makes excellent sense to regard equality as the constitutional
rhetoric of choice.").
88. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassi-
fication or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) ("Antisubordination theor-
ists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of
pervasive social stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and practices
that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups."); Karst, supra
note 25, at 6 ("The [American] principle of equal citizenship presumptively insists that the
organized society treat each individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect, one who
'belongs.' Stated negatively, the principle presumptively forbids the organized society to
treat an individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparti-
cipant."); Karst, supra note 3, at 272-89 (discussing the equal citizenship principle); Dimi-
try Kochenov, lus Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Rela-
tionship Between Status and Rights, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169, 173 (2009) ("The emphasis
on equality is particularly important in the citizenship context.... By virtue of simply be-
ing a citizen, any individual can expect to be regarded as being as valuable a member of
the community as any other individual possessing the same status.").
89. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blind-
ness Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 79
(2000).
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Those in favor of advancing equality should wish to give it
comprehensive breadth in the application of all laws and policies.
The anti-interference principle is a concept of equality that ex-
tends beyond race, sexual orientation, gender, class, and other
hot topics. It should extend to our treatment of the wealthy ver-
sus the poor, the healthy versus the diseased, the educated versus
the uneducated, and the sophisticated versus the socially inept.
No one's activities or pocketbooks should be unequally affected by
governmental action if their activities do not cause harm to oth-
ers. Equality requires the prevention of interference unless and
until the action causes interference with others.90
The anti-interference principle captures all forms of discrimi-
nation. There are two principal categories. First, governmental
actions that specifically target some for disadvantage challenge
equality. This is the area most often associated with what in
common usage is considered "discrimination," even though that
term should have a broader meaning. Second, governmental ac-
tions that privilege, prefer, or advantage some, while explicitly or
implicitly excluding others from such beneficial treatment, status,
or access, challenge equality. This is the area most often asso-
ciated with the terms "reverse discrimination" or "redistribution,"
including social entitlements or corporate subsidies alike. In this
second category a few suffer for the benefit of others (through
taxes, lost opportunity, or access to limited or finite resources,
etc.)-taking from one to give to another is itself favoritism and
deprives one man of his freedom. It is a principle that prohibits
regulating differently as much as it precludes subsidizing favora-
bly. Under the anti-interference principle, neither form of un-
equal treatment is justifiable without proof of (1) causation of (2)
real, legal harm that is (3) traceable to the action of the disadvan-
taged or excluded person or group. In other words, unequal inter-
ference with autonomy that is necessary to accomplish either
form of differential treatment is not justifiable absent such find-
ings.
Advantage and disadvantage alike should be earned, not dic-
tated. When one causes harm, he deserves disadvantage-he has
in a sense "earned" his discriminatory treatment and the avoid-
90. On the meaning of "interference," see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (9th ed.




ance of harm justifies such treatment. For the same reasons,
state-sanctioned preference should be prohibited. When one is
causing no harm, he should not be required to face disadvantage
to provide someone else advantage-to suffer in order to provide
unearned advantages to another or in order to cure a condition
that he has not caused. Those are the concepts inherent in an
anti-interference principle. Those are the concepts that capture
the meaning of the word equality.
Law and policy should protect the concept of equality to provide
persons an equal chance-an equal opportunityst-to access privi-
leges or immunities and to receive nondiscriminatory treatment.
Furthermore, equality in law should not mean that everyone is
entitled to an equal outcome.9 2 To conclude otherwise would be
antithetical to the true nature of the concept.13
What I am calling the anti-interference principle first man-
dates an appreciation for the individual and the protection of his
liberty and choice in relation to the state. As Madison explained:
[A]s a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally
said to have a property in his rights. Where an excess of power pre-
vails, property of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in his opi-
nions, his person, his faculties, or his possessions.94
Several additional insights on the neutrality concept inherent
in equality are also helpful. Hayek, for example, adopts and ex-
plains the Greek word "isonomia" as meaning "equality of laws to
all manner of persons." 5 Isonomia rejects special privileges and
classifications based on rank in society.96
91. See Karst, supra note 3, at 263 ('The ideal of equal opportunity is well established
as part of the American tradition of constitutional equality.").
92. A NEw DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS: ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT
AND MODERN SOURCES 357 (H.L. Mencken ed., 1946) [hereinafter Mencken] ("Men are en-
titled to equal rights-but to equal rights to unequal things." (quoting Charles James Fox
(1749-1806))).
93. Kochenov, supra note 88, at 173 n.24 ("'Equality' here does not refer to equality in
fact (as the Communist societies were trying to achieve) but the equality of opportunity.").
94. James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
95. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 164 (1960); see also Karst, supra note
3, at 261 ("Americans have always understood that in a fair competition there will be win-
ners and losers.").
96. Hayek continues that "it described a state which Solon had earlier established in
Athens when he gave the people 'equal laws for the noble and the base."' HAYEK, supra
note 95, at 164 (footnote omitted).
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A related premise is that equality of opportunity need not
mean equality of resulting condition.7 As James Madison ex-
plained, inequality of outcomes is part of the natural condition in
a free society:
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of prop-
erty originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of
interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of gov-
ernment. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of
property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensues a division
of the society into different interests and parties.98
It is social engineering to create labels and classes, with the
imprimatur of law, to give privileges or immunities to some and
deny them to others. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Miller
v. Johnson, "[T]he Government must treat citizens as individuals,
not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class.""9 Equality in law should mean the equality of chance and
opportunity yet not guarantee equality in outcome.100 We need not
spread the wealth'01 to achieve equality in our legal system, but
we must spread the equality of treatment if equality is to mean
anything at all. "Spreading the wealth" is the antithesis of equali-
97. JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT 104 (George Dekker & Lar-
ry Johnston eds., Penguin Books 1969) (1838) ("Equality, in a social sense, may be divided
into that of condition, and that of rights. Equality of condition is incompatible with civili-
zation, and is found only to exist in those communities that are but slightly removed from
the savage state. In practice, it can only mean a common misery.').
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); see
also Karst, supra note 3, at 261 ("James Madison in The Federalist had recognized that
equal opportunity meant unequal results.").
99. 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. Mencken, supra note 92, at 357 ("All men have an equal right to the free develop-
ment of their faculties; they have an equal right to the impartial protection of the state;
but it is not true, it is against all the laws of reason and equity, it is against the eternal
nature of things, that the indolent man and the laborious man, the spendthrift and the
economist, the imprudent and the wise, should obtain and enjoy an equal amount of
goods." (quoting Victor Cousin, Justice et Charitg, 1848)).
101. This, of course, is a reference to the infamous Barack Obama response to "Joe the
Plumber." See Charles Hurt, Obama Fires a Robin Hood Warning Shot, N.Y. POST, Oct.
15, 2008, at 6 ("Barack Obama let slip his plans to become a modern-day Robin Hood in
the White House, confiscating money from the rich to give to the poor. . . . Then, Obama
explained his trickle-up theory of economics. . . . 'I think when you spread the wealth
around, it's good for everybody."); see also Karst, supra note 3, at 263 ("From time to time,
and particularly in recent years, egalitarian rhetoric has extended beyond equal opportu-
nity to calls for a greater equality of outcomes.").
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ty as understood in a classical liberal theory of government. 102 In
fact, some have recognized that it is our ethic for equality within
this country that has contributed to a tradition against "level-
ing."03
Moreover, there is a profound risk of interference when the
government dictates or hinders individual decisionmaking. The
intervention of legal conscriptions on individual choices means
that we are not equal-someone else has paternalistically decided
something for us rather than allow for independent choice. Indi-
vidualism is always eroded if all individuals-equally-are in-
capable of designing their personal plan. We must be cognizant
that every interference with personal choice is an interference
with equality.
We turn now from the individual liberty component of the anti-
interference principle to the harm component. The anti-
interference principle finds its second major grounding in the
harm principle championed by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty.10 4
Mill "assert[s] one very simple principle" that:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or col-
lectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for re-
monstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any
evil in case he do otherwise."o'
102. "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not
constitutionally required." Rossie v. State, 395 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
103. Karst, supra note 3, at 261-63 ("What is remarkable is that this country has never
been swept up by a political movement devoted to leveling. . . . Americans accept wide dis-
parities in wealth and income, so long as the system remains open and people at the bot-
tom of the economic scale are relieved from the kinds of deprivation that stigmatize or ex-
clude them from participation in society." (footnotes omitted)).
104. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10-11 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.
1975) (1859).
105. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Under the harm principle, governmental power is highly limite to
the prevention of harm to others only.106
Mill's strategies for implementation of the harm principle are
certainly open to criticism, which they have received from Epstein
and others,o' but his starting thesis is instructive here. No doubt
devising strategies for the implementation of the anti-
interference principle-a challenge not taken up in this essay-
would garner much critique as well.
If we accept Mill's view, then an anti-interference principle, for
equality purposes, captures both the interference of the govern-
ment with the equal enjoyment of freedoms of the governed and
the interference of one man against another. Upon acceptance of
the harm principle, it must follow first that government cannot
limit the freedom of some to do that thing others enjoy the free-
dom to do, unless allowing those some an equal freedom would
cause harm to others. Second, it must also follow that the gov-
ernment cannot compel some to do for others things to "equalize"
their condition if that some did not directly cause the harm that is
asserted to exist in the unequal conditions. And, of course, simply
exercising one's own concerns may have accidental or indirect and
incidental effects on others (particularly when it comes to the ac-
quisition of finite and competitive goods or in other zero-sum sit-
uations, for example), but this is only consequence, not harm.
As to the first point above, a principle of anti-interference
means that the government cannot intervene in the equal exploi-
tation of freedoms unless the discriminatory intervention is based
on a justifiable belief that those adversely treated will otherwise
cause harm. And as to the second point above, the principle
means that an individual shall be under an anti-interference ob-
ligation of his own vis-a-vis others to not cause any harm that
would prevent those others from equal access to such freedoms;
and that individual is to otherwise be free from the type of inter-
ference from the state that creates redistributive obligations or
unequal constraints designed to benefit some others at his ex-
pense unless it can be proven that others were directly harmed by
his actions and he was somehow unjustly enriched by his imposi-
106. See Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-And How It Grew, 45 U. TORONTO
L.J. 369, 371 (1995); see also Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 215, 215 (2006).
107. See Epstein, supra note 106, at 370; Ripstein, supra note 106, at 215.
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tion of harms or externalization of the costs of his actions. And as
each man stands in a reciprocal relationship with another, one
man cannot ask that an innocent man be deprived of some liberty
when he has done nothing to surrender his right to be left free of
his neighbor's interference-i.e., where he has caused no harms
that forfeit or relinquish his freedom from interference.
Simply put, government interference or intervention is justified
only when a person's actions cause harm. Differential treatment is
justified only when those persons subject to it receive such treat-
ment because the character of the difference is the cause of the
harm for which a remedy is sought by the government's interven-
tion and achieved by the inequality in treatment.
The anti-interference bases for reaching these conclusions are
not only grounded in the harm principle but also in the basic co-
rollary understanding of externalities and the maxim of sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas."10 The U.S. Supreme Court has ex-
plained that "[t]he doctrine that each one must so use his own as
not to injure his neighbor-sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-
is the rule by which every member of society must possess and
enjoy his property."os Stated differently, one may act as he wishes
so long as he internalizes the costs of his actions, thereby respect-
ing others by not imposing negative externalities. Indeed, the
Court has explained as "the very essence of government" the so-
cial compact's authorization for "the establishment of laws requir-
ing each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own proper-
ty, as not unnecessarily to injure another,""o as expressed in this
sic utere maxim. Related adages include "[y]our right to swing
your arms ends just where the other man's nose begins,"" or al-
ternatively, "[m]y property rights in my knife allow me to leave it
where I will, but not in your chest.""2
108. Translated as "[s]o use your own property as not to injure that of another."
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (3d ed. 1969).
109. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876); see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967); Donald J. Kochan, Runoff
and Reality: Externalities, Economics, and Traceability Issues in Urban Runoff Regula-
tion, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 409, 419-21 (2006).
110. Munn, 94 U.S. at 124.
111. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957
(1919).
112. NOZICK, supra note 21, at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Of course, the problem becomes how to define harm and what
aggravating factors we might require even when a seemingly
negative externality occurs so as to hold the perpetrator of the ex-
ternality liable or responsible to the receptor. A problem arises in
application of these maxims when we have too broad a definition
of "harm" or "negative externalities." The next steps of course are
determining what harm means, who gets to decide, and whether
there can be a means or defense for a limited definition. Undoub-
tedly, the meaning of "negative" and the meaning of "harm"
create implementation problems, and as Harcourt and others
suggest, these terms can and have been used as a justification for
an increased scope of claimed "legitimate" intervention."11 The
terms can be manipulated to become as mutable as the terms li-
berty, equality, public interest, or scores of other like terms. That
is a legitimate critique of the anti-interference principle. The risk
lies in people gathering "findings," attempting to fit regulations
into categories of causation or harm. These standards make im-
plementation of an anti-interference principle difficult. The defi-
nitions of these limiting terms inevitably will be susceptible to
competing factions as such things always are.
This essay does not endeavor to propose a complete solution to
that problem or to outline an implementation plan, other than to
suggest that our standards regarding causation and traceability
can and should act as a check on broad justifications based on the
"collective social harm" (by focusing on causation and traceability
standards for particularized activities as a necessary predicate of
proof of harm). Only an adherence to a strict definition of causa-
tion, harm, and traceability that would exclude avoidance of "col-
lective impact" analysis or protection of "social fabric" type ends
should be satisfactory.
Furthermore, only by distilling unacceptable negative external-
ities can we properly define legal rules. We must re-embrace the
understanding that not just any injury or incidental negative ef-
fect constitutes a legal wrong that suffices to justify government
intervention. Mill's harm principle incorporates the negative ex-
ternality concept, and also cautions that the scope of things con-
stituting harms (or, "actionable" negative externalities) must be
113. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
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limited to interference with another individual's reciprocal rights
to his own liberty:
The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to socie-
ty for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person
but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other
people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only
measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or dis-
approbation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable,
and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if socie-
ty is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protec-
tion."4
Harm, in this sense, requires causation between the individu-
al's action and a direct, traceable disruption to the reciprocal li-
berty of another to live his life with the same sic utere-based free-
dom. As Mill explained, dislike or even disgust of some, or
conversely special like or reverence for others, are not justifiable
reasons for the discriminatory interference with liberty and
choice precisely because such discriminatory allocation of benefits
or burdens is not based on the antecedent showing of actual, legal
harm in its proper sense and meaning.
So, the most equalizing concept is non-interference-so long as
one does not impose externalities on another he should not be
constrained in his actions. And, it is this concept-combined with
a reciprocal respect for it-that protects the true nature of equali-
ty. No one has more rights or privileges than another in the face
of each other. And, no one has less either.
The anti-interference principle means let one live her life-so
long as she harms no others-and do not otherwise place burdens
on that life, living, profit, or pursuit of happiness. That is what
we can learn from the sic utere maxim and the harm principle.
Equality means making no distinctions, no differentiations-no
interference unless the person is interfering with others and has
"earned" the negative treatment. Unless one does harm, he is en-
titled to equal opportunity to the privileges and immunities of ci-
tizenship that all should share. And to the extent the government
chooses to impose burdens, as it is want to do, the burdens should
be equal.
114. MILL, supra note 104, at 87.
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This brings us to an equalizing factor in the anti-interference
principle. Along the way in this discussion, one may have ques-
tioned whether there is a distinction between equal economic
treatment and equal "civil" treatment. There is not. The anti-
interference principle can and should be applied neutrally and
equally without regard to whether the issue is considered eco-
nomic, social, or civil. Differential treatment through progressive
taxation, for example, is differential treatment based not on harm
but on mere differences in wealth. Differential treatment based
on race or gender-in any direction (whether in directly excluding
certain persons or directly preferring others)-is differential
treatment based not on harm but on pigment or chromosomes.
Differential treatment giving some welfare-in any direction
(whether it be for the poor or involve corporate subsidies, bai-
louts, or the like)-is differential treatment based not on harm
but on a mere social preference for one over another. Creating an
institution like marriage yet excluding segments of the popula-
tion from accessing the institution and all the benefits (and bur-
dens) available in it is differential treatment not based on a pre-
ference to avoid harm, or precluding someone from a benefit
because they have done something legally wrong, but instead
based on some artificial classification based on a preference of
giving more to some over others.
Obviously, the advocates in some of these philosophical
camps-economic rights view versus social rights view-seldom
mix. Yet, the anti-interference principle is a neutral doctrine that
should align all of these normally divergent interests. A prin-
cipled stance on equality requires a consistent approach. Equality
is equality, regardless of the metric applied. The fact of one's race,
gender, sexuality, wealth, and like conditions is not a harm. And,
if the fact of one's condition is not a harm, that fact cannot be
used as the basis for differential treatment-by impediment or
propellant alike.
Only facts of traceable harm, with proof of causation, can over-
come the presumption against interference with an individual's
liberty that should be applied to test the legitimacy of govern-
mental action. Do not interfere with one's life unless he is truly
interfering with others. Do not constrain or handcuff one's free-
dom unless it truly interferes with another's life or freedom. In
the end, principle should supersede special interests or societal
commands, and the law should be crafted to protect a person's
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natural equality.115 There is no duty to rescue and no duty to oth-
ers one does not negatively affect. Imposing affirmative obliga-
tions without proving negative externalities, and doing so selec-
tively, is interference with individual freedoms, privileges, and
immunities-just like telling the passing firefighters in Ricci that
they would not be promoted simply because others failed. By
passing the test, they did not impose negative externalities on
others.
Although not posited as a rationale by either the court in Perry
or the Court in Ricci, both results would have been justified in
their result under an application of the principle of anti-
interference. By advancing one's own interest in succeeding in a
job competition or entering into a consensual two-party relation-
ship, those persons are not harming another. Incidental effects
not rising to the level of legal wrongs-defined as the infringe-
ment of the reciprocal liberty of others-cannot overcome the pre-
sumption against interference. With these examples in mind, I
hope that ongoing debates on equality will also be informed by
the premises that underlie the anti-interference principle. There
at least should be a discussion on equality that includes not just
race, sex, sexual orientation, or class, but also every form of diffe-
rential law and policymaking, including things like income dis-
crimination and resource redistribution. Even if not constitution-
ally mandated, the anti-interference principle is sound guidance
for judging the appropriateness of governmental intervention and
the inherent limits of state power in the larger context of the juri-
sprudential debate. 116
The anti-interference principle could provide a unifying, consis-
tent, and neutral approach. With its application, one would reach
the same results achieved in Brown, Loving, Perry, Ricci, and
other cases that have invalidated governmental action on equal
protection grounds. I contend that anti-interference is really what
is, or should be, at the heart of the review in these cases where
the bases for state action in creating separate or discriminatory
standards or engaging in discriminatory treatment are scruti-
115. See Mencken, supra note 92, at 357 ("So far as the natural law is concerned, all
men are equal." (quoting Domitius Ulpianus, Liber singularis regularum, c.220)); id. ("All
men have equal rights to liberty, to their property and to the protection of the laws." (quot-
ing Voltaire, Essai sur les mceurs, 1754)).
116. Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 213 (2004).
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nized. Of course, because it has not been an adopted canon and
equality jurisprudence lacks a cohesive and consistent doctrine,
many other court decisions already exist that muddle our under-
standing of the proper and legitimate role of the state and the
limits on governmental power from an equality constraint. Given
political realities, it is unrealistic to predict widespread adhe-
rence to such a broad interpretation of the equality concept, but it
is worthwhile to inject it into the ongoing equality discussion.
As Mill stated, "The only part of the conduct of any one, for
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign."m1 Unless and until harm is proven,
caused by and traced to an individual or group, the government
must engage in a practice of non-interference with that realm of
individual sovereignty. Equality demands that the government
refrain from singling people out for differential treatment unless
the stated, initial differential position is itself the thing that
causes harm.
CONCLUSION
In the end, again, equality matters. The law will always strug-
gle with its definition. It is not realistic to believe that classifica-
tions, preferences, progressive taxation, or other unequal laws
will disappear. Yet, if we do not reflect on equality and its foun-
dational elements, we risk getting lost and diverted from its most
respectful meaning. The anti-interference principle provides a
new prism for analysis of and point of departure for reaching
some further substance and clarity in the equality discourse.
117. MILL, supra note 104, at 1.
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